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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In May 2003 the ECB explicitly announced its view that price stability corresponds to
an inﬂation rate below but close to 2% over the medium term. Unfortunately, most
theoretical models in the recent literature say little about how a positive inﬂation target
such as this is likely to aﬀect the optimal short-run stabilization policy of the ECB.
Indeed, with few notable exceptions (e.g., Khan et al., 2003 and Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe, 2004, 2005), the recent literature is typically based on a version of the New
Keynesian model that is log-linearized around a zero inﬂation steady state. This paper
aims to solve this inconsistency by addressing the question of how optimal monetary
policy is aﬀected by positive trend inﬂation.1
There are two important reasons why the monetary policy literature has focussed
on the zero inﬂation steady state. The ﬁrst is analytical convenience. The second is
that zero inﬂation is optimal in a so-called cashless economy (see Goodfriend and King,
2001, and Woodford, 2003). However, quite special theoretical assumptions are needed
before optimal steady-state inﬂation is equal to zero in any framework.
We think instead that there are compelling reasons to look at the case of low and
positive trend inﬂation. First, the case of zero inﬂation is unrealistic in the light of the
post-war economic history of industrialized countries. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004)
use the average US GDP deﬂator growth rate in 1960-1998 to calibrate the steady state
inﬂation rate to 4.2%. The average inﬂation rate for European countries in post-war
years ranges from about 3% in Germany to almost 10% in Spain (OECD data). Hence,
we should study optimal stabilization policy in such an environment. This is even more
important if these models are used empirically to assess the behavior of central banks
in the post-war period. Second, the practice of many central banks suggests that zero
steady-state inﬂation is not their real target. In other words, zero inﬂation does not
coincide with the concept of “price stability” held by central bankers, as the ECB case
illustrates. It is therefore important to check whether results in the existing literature
are robust to moderately positive trend inﬂation levels.
This article owes much to the seminal works of Clarida et al. (1999) and Galí (2003),
and can be interpreted as a generalization of their ﬁndings to the case of positive trend
inﬂation. Indeed, we provide a simple extension of their framework with the main change
being an extra equation that arises when the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) is
generalized. Our model thus encompasses the standard framework, allowing us to ﬁnd
intuitive analytical results for the case of discretionary monetary policy, and develop
straightforward comparisons with standard results.
Our main ﬁnding is that optimal monetary policy is highly sensitive to low levels of
trend inﬂation. In particular, as trend inﬂation increases we ﬁnd that monetary policy
progressively loses its ability to stabilize inﬂation. The reason is that trend inﬂation
makes ﬁrms more concerned that their prices keep up with the trend in inﬂation, so they
are not eroded in relative terms. The optimal reset price is therefore less aﬀected by the
current level of economic activity, the NKPC is ﬂatter, and the current output gap has
less eﬀect on current inﬂation. As a result, under positive trend inﬂation and optimal
discretionary policy we ﬁnd: (i) the rational expectations equilibrium (REE, henceforth)
is not always determinate; (ii) the eﬃcient policy frontier deteriorates substantially.
1Trend inﬂation is deﬁned here as the rate of inﬂation in deterministic steady state.
3Moreover, under positive trend inﬂation and optimal commitment policy we have: (i)
impulse response functions and gains from commitment are highly sensitive to the level
of trend inﬂation; (ii) interest rate smoothing increases with trend inﬂation. Finally,
our model is able to match the positive empirical correlation between average inﬂation
and inﬂation variability.
As in the standard literature, the monetary authority in our framework controls
the nominal interest rate to stabilize inﬂation and output gap around long-run targets.
We therefore ask how the optimal response to shocks is aﬀected when trend inﬂation
assumes empirically relevant values. Our results serve as a warning against the empirical
application of existing New Keynesian models, especially versions of the models that
cannot explain observed trend inﬂation. The trend rates of inﬂation we examine are,
however, generally inconsistent with long-run minimization of our assumed loss function.
Thus, the true extent and nature of the problem analyzed in this paper will not be
known until a model is derived that can predict a positive average rate of inﬂation. The
features that would deliver an endogenously optimal positive long-run inﬂation are likely
to further aﬀect the short-run Phillips curve, and may thus change the results of this
paper both quantitatively and qualitatively. At the very least, though, our contribution
highlights the need for such a model.
Our work is linked to some recent contributions that have appeared in the literature.
Khan et al. (2003) show that the optimal long-run inﬂation rate is actually negative,
because a negative rate balances the beneﬁts of following the Friedman rule and the
costs of relative price distortions. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005) perform a similar
exercise in a medium-scale model incorporating ﬁscal policy and many distortions. In
contrast, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) look at optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy
when treating the level of trend inﬂation as exogenously calibrated to US post-war data.
Our paper is complementary to these works, but diﬀers in two important respects.
Firstly, none of the above contributions investigate how optimal monetary policy is
aﬀected by changes in trend inﬂation. Secondly, our framework is suﬃciently tractable
to deliver many analytic results, whereas the above works rely mainly on numerical
results.
2T r e n d I n ﬂation and the Basic New-Keynesian Model
In this section we extend the basic New Keynesian framework of Clarida et al. (1999),
Galí (2003) and Woodford (2003) to allow for positive trend inﬂation.
2.1 The model
Households
















where β ∈ (0,1) is the subjective rate of time preference and E0 is the expectation
operator conditional on time t =0information. The instantaneous utility function is
increasing in the consumption of a ﬁnal good (Ct) and real money balances (Mt/Pt),
4and decreasing in labor (Nt). The positive parameters σc and σm represent inverse
intertemporal elasticities of substitution in consumption and real money balances. χm
and χn are positive constants.2 At a given period t, the representative household faces
the following nominal ﬂow budget constraint:
PtCt + Mt + Bt ≤ PtwtNt + Mt−1 +( 1+it−1)Bt−1 + Dt + Tt,( 2 )
where Pt is the price of the ﬁnal good, Mt is nominal money, Bt are bonds with a one-
period nominal return it, wt is the real wage and Dt are ﬁrm proﬁts that are returned
to households. In addition, in each period the government makes lump-sum nominal
transfers to households of Tt. The household’s problem is to maximize (1) subject to
the sequence of budget constraints (2), yielding the following ﬁrst order conditions:
labor supply : χnCσc
t = wt,( 3 )
money demand : χm (Mt/Pt)
−σm Cσc
t = it/(1 + it),( 4 )




t+1 (1 + it)Pt/Pt+1
¤
.( 5 )
Equations (3), (4) and (5) have the usual economic interpretation.
Final good producers
In each period t,aﬁnal good Yt is produced by perfectly competitive ﬁrms using a






θ−1 ,w i t hθ>1.T a k i n gp r i c e sa sg i v e n ,t h eﬁnal good producer chooses
intermediate good quantities Yt (i) to maximize proﬁts, resulting in the usual demand
schedule: Yt (i)=[ Pt (i)/Pt]
−θ Yt. The zero proﬁt condition of ﬁnal good producers







Intermediate inputs Yt (i) are produced by a continuum of ﬁrms i ∈ [0,1] with
technology Yt (i)=Nt (i). Prices are sticky, with intermediate goods producers in
monopolistic competition setting prices according to a standard discrete-time version of
the Calvo (1983) mechanism. In each period there is a ﬁxed probability (1 − α) that a
ﬁrm can re-optimize; with probability α the ﬁrm must keep its nominal price unchanged.























t (i) denotes the new optimal price, Γt+j (i) is the real total cost function and




















i ,( 8 )
2To derive analytical results we adopt the simple Hansen (1985) indivisible labor model. Our results
do not depend on this assumption.
5where Γ0
t (i) denotes the real marginal cost function.3 To see how trend inﬂation aﬀects
the optimizing behavior of intermediate ﬁrms, it is useful to expand (8) and make explicit





















i .( 9 )
It is insightful at this stage to look at the steady-state behavior of (9) by setting
Πt+j = γ for j =1 ,2,···,∞. Then, in the standard case of zero trend inﬂation,
γ =1and the CGIRs attached to future expected terms are equal to one at all times.
Future expected terms are discounted by αβ. With positive trend inﬂation, γ>1
and two eﬀects come into play. First, CGIRs at diﬀerent time horizons shift upwards,
which changes the eﬀective discount factors αβγθ and αβγθ−1 in the numerator and
denominator respectively. Accordingly, when intermediate ﬁrms are free to adjust they
will set higher prices to try to oﬀset the erosion of relative prices and proﬁts that trend
inﬂation automatically creates. Second, future terms in (9) are progressively multiplied
by larger CGIRs. This means that optimal price-setting under trend inﬂation reﬂects
future economic conditions more than short-run cyclical variations. Price-setting ﬁrms
become more “forward-looking”, as does inﬂation. These eﬀects are the main driving
force behind our results.
Government
The government injects money into the economy through nominal transfers, so Tt =
Ms
t −Ms
t−1 where Ms is aggregate nominal money supply. Most importantly, we assume
that steady-state money supply evolves according to the following ﬁxed rule: Ms
t =
γMs
t−1,w h e r eγ is the (gross) steady-state growth rate of the nominal money supply.
Market clearing conditions
The market clearing conditions in the goods, money and labour markets are: Yt = Ct;
Y s
t (i)=Y D
t (i)=[ Pt (i)/Pt]
−θ Yt , ∀i; Mt = Ms
t and Nt =
R 1
0 Nt(i)di respectively.
2.2 A generalized New Keynesian Phillips Curve
Log-linearizing (4) and (5), and using the market clearing condition ˆ Yt = ˆ Ct, we obtain:
βˆ ıt = −σm (γ − β)ˆ mt + σc (γ − β) ˆ Yt, (10)
ˆ Yt = Etˆ Yt+1 − σ−1
c (ˆ ıt − Etˆ πt+1), (11)
where hatted variables denote percentage deviations from the deterministic steady state.
The log-linearization of equation (8) leads to a system of two ﬁrst-order expectational
diﬀerence equations that characterize the generalized NKPC under trend inﬂation:
3In a deterministic steady state the inﬁnite sums in equation (8) converge if and only if αβγ
θ < 1
(see Ascari, 2004). In what follows we assume that this condition holds. For the benchmark calibration
values in Table 1, it implies that annual trend inﬂation has to be lower than 11.4%.
4We deﬁne the CGIR between time t +1and t + j as Πt+1,t+j = Πt+1 × Πt+2 ×···×Πt+j,w h e r e















(1 − σc) ˆ Yt + αβγθ−1Et
h
(θ − 1) ˆ πt+1 + ˆ φt+1
i (12)
where κ ≡ (γ − 1)(σc − 1)β
¡
1 − αγθ−1¢
+ σc¯ λ(γ), ¯ λ(γ) ≡ (1−αγθ−1)(1−αβγθ)
αγθ−1 and ˆ φt is
an auxiliary variable with no obvious interpretation. Our generalization encompasses
the standard NKPC. Indeed, when γ =1equation (12) reduces to ˆ πt = βEtˆ πt+1 +
(1−α)(1−αβ)σc
α ˆ Yt and the auxiliary variable ˆ φt is irrelevant for inﬂation dynamics.
Three points are worth stressing. Firstly, trend inﬂa t i o nd r a m a t i c a l l ya l t e r st h e
dynamics of inﬂation compared to the usual Calvo model with γ =1 . The elasticity
κ of inﬂation to the current output gap in (12) is now a function of γ as well as the
usual α, β, θ and σc. For standard calibration values, trend inﬂation leads to a smaller
coeﬃcient on the current output gap and larger coeﬃcients on future expected inﬂation
and Etˆ φt+1. In other words, trend inﬂation ﬂattens the short-run NKPC. For given
future expectations, current inﬂation reacts less to a given change in current output (or
current output has to move more to cause a given change in current inﬂation). The
intuition behind this result is the way intermediate ﬁrms become more forward-looking
when setting prices under trend inﬂa t i o n ,a se x p l a i n e di ns e c t i o n2 . 1A st r e n di n ﬂation
increases, future economic conditions carry more weight and current output becomes less
important as a determinant of reset prices. The contemporaneous relation between ˆ πt
and ˆ Yt progressively weakens and the inﬂation rate becomes less sensitive to variations
in the output gap.
Secondly, the system of equations (11) and (12) represents a compact generalization
of the standard New Keynesian model. The NKPC under trend inﬂation is deﬁned
simply by adding an additional equation that explains the evolution of the auxiliary
variable ˆ φt.
Thirdly, in what follows we assume log-utility in consumption so σc → 1.T h e
equation for ˆ φt then depends only on future expected variables and can be ignored
under discretionary policy.
2.3 Transmission of monetary policy shocks
This section analyses the monetary policy transmission mechanism when the money
supply growth rate is assumed to follow an exogenous AR(1) process. Table 1 shows the
benchmark calibration and parameter values are as in Galí (2003).5 Figure 1 displays
impulse responses functions (IRFs, hereafter) for the responses of output gap, inﬂation,
real interest rate and real money balances to a unit shock to the growth rate of money.
Each panel shows IRFs for six levels of trend inﬂation: 0, 2%, 4%, 6%, 8% and 10%.
Consider ﬁrst the case of zero steady-state inﬂation. In response to the money supply
growth rate shock, sluggish adjustment of individual prices leads to a gradual upward
adjustment of the aggregate price level, thereby causing an increase in both inﬂation
5The persistence parameter of the money supply growth rate process is set to 0.5, as in Galí (2003).
Moreover, changes in the values of θ and σc have similar eﬀects in our model to those in a standard
model (see equation (12)). We only present results for the benchmark calibration since the qualitative
eﬀects of trend inﬂation do not depend on the precise values of calibrated parameters.
7and real money balances. Output and the nominal interest rate need to adjust to satisfy
the money demand equation (10). If we assume momentarily that money demand is in-
terest inelastic (i.e., a quantity theory money demand), the persistent increase in money
growth leads to higher expected inﬂation in the future and a long period of negative
(ex-ante) real interest rates. Given the Euler equation (11), households bring forward
consumption; demand and output both increase. Indeed, solving the Euler equation
forward shows ˆ Yt = −σ−1
c Et
P∞
i=0 (ˆ ıt+i − ˆ πt+1+i) and the output eﬀect is deﬁned by
the extent to which the money supply growth rate shock inﬂuences current and future
short-term expected real interest rates. For our benchmark calibration, the rise in out-
put on impact is so high that equation (10) requires the nominal interest rate to jump
up rather than down after a positive money shock.6 On impact, output jumps by 1.48%
and inﬂation by 2%, with both progressively returning to steady state values as prices
sluggishly adjust.
With the discussion of section 2.3 in mind, it is easy to explain why trend inﬂation has
such a notable eﬀect on the impulse response functions in Figure 1. Speciﬁcally, trend
inﬂation causes newly reset prices to be less sensitive to current economic conditions, so
money supply growth shocks have a larger eﬀect on real money balances as the level of
trend inﬂation rises. The output gap response similarly increases to satisfy the money
demand and Euler equations. The inﬂation response decreases.
There is also a second eﬀect of higher trend inﬂation in that the persistence of the
output and inﬂation IRFs increases substantially. As shown in Table 2, the half-life of
both output and inﬂation is 3.5 quarters when steady-state inﬂation is zero, but rises
to 8.7 for output and 8.3 for inﬂation when steady-state inﬂation is 10%. The intuition
for this is again the eﬀect that trend inﬂation has on the output-inﬂation trade-oﬀ.I t
i si m p o r t a n tt os t r e s st h a tm o d i f y i n gt h eN K P Ct oa l l o wf o rt r e n di n ﬂation leads to
substantial changes in the dynamics of the model.7
3 Optimal Monetary Policy Under Discretion
As in Clarida et al. (1999) and Galí (2003), we assume that the monetary authority sets
the nominal interest rate to minimize a discounted sum of expected instantaneous loss














where χ is the relative weight placed on output gap stabilization. We also follow Clarida
et al. (1999) and Galí (2003) by adding a cost-push shock ut = ρut−1 + εt; εt ∼ i.i.d.
N(0,1) to the ﬁrst equation in (12). The policy problem is to choose the optimal nominal
interest rate path that minimizes (13), subject to the IS curve (11) and the NKPC (12).
Under discretion, the monetary authority is unable to make credible announcements
about future policy actions. Thus, it re-optimizes (13) each period taking future expec-
6See Galí (2003) on the lack of liquidity eﬀect in this type of model.
7Ascari and Ropele (2005) study the dynamic properties of this model when monetary policy is
implemented by a Taylor interest rate rule. See also Amano et al. (2005).
8tations as given. The solution is:




T h ep r e s c r i p t i o ni st h u sf o rd i s c r e t i o n a r yp olicy to “lean against the wind”. The solution
is very similar to the standard one obtained with zero steady-state inﬂation. There is,
however, a crucial diﬀerence in that the “aggressiveness” with which the output gap
responds to inﬂation is now dependent on the level of trend inﬂation. The higher trend
inﬂation, the less aggressively the monetary authority ﬁghts inﬂation and the more
output is stabilized. This is due to the change in the slope of the short-run NKPC,
whereby higher trend inﬂation lowers the gain in terms of reduced inﬂation for each unit
of output loss, i.e., ¯ λ(γ) is a decreasing function of γ. The worsening of the inﬂation-
output trade-oﬀ induces a less aggressive policy response to inﬂation, making shocks
pass through more into inﬂation than output, and increasing the relative variability of
inﬂation (σπ/σY ).
This result also has an appealing empirical implication in that it implies a positive
correlation between average inﬂation and the variance of inﬂation. Such a correlation
has robust empirical support, both over time and across countries (see, e.g., Friedman,
1977, Ball and Cecchetti, 1990, and Caporale and McKiernan, 1997). We stress that
our positive correlation between γ and σπ stems from the optimal response of monetary
policy.
3.1 An indeterminacy problem
Substituting condition (14) into (12), the system can be solved for ˆ πt and ˆ φt as a
function of the only state variable ut. ˆ Yt and ˆ ıt are then determined by (14) and the IS
curve respectively. However, when γ ∈
£
1,(1/αβ)1/θ¢
there is a potential problem with
uniqueness of the REE.
Proposition 1 Let σc = β =1 . The dynamic system deﬁned by optimal monetary
policy under discretion admits a unique REE if and only if:
χθ(γ − 1)
£¯ λ(γ)
¤2 < 1. (15)
It follows that large values of γ lead to an indeterminate REE, whereas indeterminacy
never arises with the standard assumption of zero trend inﬂation (i.e., γ =1 ).8 However,
for any (admissible) value of trend inﬂation there is always a suﬃciently low value of χ
to ensure the REE is unique.9 In other words, the higher the value of trend inﬂation the
more “conservative” a central bank needs to be to guarantee uniqueness of REE under
optimal discretionary policy.
Figure 2 shows the combinations of (γ,χ) that ensure uniqueness of the REE with
the benchmark calibration of Table 1, for γ ∈ [1,1.02] and χ ∈ [0,1]. Three things are
8Ceteris paribus, indeterminacy is more likely to arise (i) the higher the level of trend inﬂation γ;
(ii) the higher the elasticity of substitution among goods θ; (iii) the higher the weight on output in the
monetary authority loss function χ; (iv) the higher the probability of not adjusting prices α.
9¯ λ(γ) tends to zero as γ tends to its upper bound (deﬁned by the condition αβγ
θ < 1), so it always
has ﬁnite value within the range of admissible values of γ.
9of note. Firstly, a 2% inﬂation rate target of the type announced by the ECB requires
a value of χ lower than 0.078 to ensure determinacy. That is, the weight on inﬂation
ﬂuctuations needs to be at least ten times higher than that on output ﬂuctuations.
Secondly, Galí (2003) calibrates the value of χ as 0.0078 in a theoretical model. In this
case, only annual levels of trend inﬂation lower than 4.7%( i . e . ,γ =1 .0116) can support
determinacy. Thirdly, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) calibrate trend inﬂation as 4.2%
to match the U.S. average GDP deﬂator growth rate over the period 1960-1989. Here,
determinacy requires the Fed’s weight on inﬂation to be roughly seventy-seven times
higher than that on output ﬂuctuations.
Figure 2 casts additional shadows on the monetary policy of many developed coun-
tries in the 70’s and 80’s, when the level of trend inﬂation was so high that determinacy
would have required central bankers to be almost pure inﬂation targeters. If we are
willing to assume that central banks at the time had no commitment power and were
not pure inﬂation targeters (see, e.g., Clarida et al., 1999), then the natural conclusion
is that monetary policy was simply not implementable during that period. Indeed, in
many countries inﬂation got out of hand after the oil shocks of the 70’s.
3.2 The eﬃcient frontier
The case of a purely transitory cost push shock yields the following analytical closed
form solution:









Note that (16) exactly parallels the solutions in Clarida et al. (1999) (i.e., equations
(3.4) and (3.5) on p. 1672) and Galí (2003) (i.e., equations (39) and (40)). However, in
our generalized case the optimal split of the shock between inﬂation and output depends
on trend inﬂation (through ¯ λ(γ)) as well as the loss function parameter χ.
Proposition 2 As trend inﬂation increases, inﬂation reacts more to the cost push
shock. The reaction of output is ambiguous, since it depends on the relative gains and
costs to stabilization, as measured by χ and ¯ λ(γ).
Inﬂation reacts more because the degree to which a contraction of the output gap
reduces inﬂation is decreasing in trend inﬂation, so the current output cost of a given
reduction in inﬂation is increasing in the level of trend inﬂation. To understand the
ambiguity of the output response note that ∂e it
∂γ < 0 if χ>2¯ λ(γ), and assume that
χ<2¯ λ(1) for zero trend inﬂation as in the benchmark calibration. As trend inﬂation
increases, the response of monetary policy is ﬁrst more aggressive (i.e., ∂e it
∂γ > 0), but
then starts to become more passive as ¯ λ(γ) falls and the above condition switches sign
to ∂e it
∂γ < 0. In the benchmark calibration, the switch in sign happens at less than
1% annual inﬂation. The reason for the switching is that the interest rate is a weaker
policy instrument in the presence of trend inﬂation. Up to a certain point the monetary
authority uses it more heavily, but then the optimal response is increasingly cautious
and passive.
This behavior is also reﬂected in the eﬃcient policy frontier that links output and
inﬂation variability for diﬀerent values of χ in (13).
10Proposition 3 Let ρ =0and σε =1so the eﬃcient policy frontier is given by σY =
1/¯ λ(γ) − σπ/¯ λ(γ).A s t r e n d i n ﬂation increases, the eﬃcient policy frontier becomes
steeper and moves to the north-east.
Points on the zero trend inﬂation frontier are no longer possible as γ rises, so there
must be an increase in σY and/or σπ as trend inﬂation increases. Figure 3 shows eﬃcient
policy frontiers for the case ρ =0 .5, with each line corresponding to a diﬀerent value
of trend inﬂation. To understand how the ﬁgure is constructed, consider the black
line with circles that displays the output-inﬂation variability frontier under zero trend
inﬂation. Any given value of χ is associated with a particular combination of σY and
σπ, and hence a circle on the line. By increasing χ from 0 to 1 (in steps of 0.01) the
circle moves from left to right and traces out the eﬃcient policy frontier. Figure 3 shows
that output (inﬂation) variability monotonically decreases (increases) as χ rises. The
ﬁgure also illustrates that trend inﬂation tilts the eﬃcient policy frontiers upwards to
the north-east, leading to worse outcomes for both inﬂation and output variability. For
instance, the points attainable with 2% trend inﬂation (the black line with stars) are no
longer attainable with 4% trend inﬂation (the black line with diamonds). Moreover, the
number of points that composes the frontier decreases with γ, because fewer values of
χ prevent the model to enter the indeterminacy region when trend inﬂa t i o ni sh i g h( s e e
Figure 2). Finally, most of the points on the eﬃcient policy frontiers are clustered in the
lower right corner, suggesting that only very low values of χ can deliver low values of
inﬂation variability. In summary, as trend inﬂation increases the frontier tilts upwards,
becomes steeper and gets shorter.
4 Optimal Monetary Policy Under Commitment
In the presence of a credible commitment mechanism, the monetary authority recognizes
that its policy actions inﬂuence agents’ expectations. In this case, it is not possible to
derive analytical results so the model is solved numerically. The two main ﬁndings are:
Result 1. Let χ∈[0,1] and γ∈[1,1.03]. The REE is always determinate under
commitment.10
Result 2. The persistence of the optimal response of the nominal interest rate to a
cost-push shock is positively correlated with the level of trend inﬂation.
It is well known that optimal monetary policy shows a certain degree of inertia under
commitment (see Woodford, 1999). Our numerical results show that optimal monetary
policy inertia, as proxied by the magnitude of the stable eigenvalues, increases with
trend inﬂation. The intuition rests on the impact of trend inﬂation on the NKPC.
Firstly, trend inﬂation makes the NKPC more forward-looking and thus reinforces the
incentive to use policy persistence to inﬂuence future expectations. Secondly, we saw
in section 2.3 that the transmission mechanism itself becomes more inertial under trend
inﬂation, since current inﬂation becomes less responsive to the output gap.
Response to a cost push shock
We now analyze IRFs of the output gap, inﬂation rate, nominal interest rate and
10For robustness, we considered sensitivity of the results to diﬀerent parametrizations of the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution (i.e., σc =5 ) and the degree of nominal stickiness (i.e., α =0 .5).
11real interest rate to a unit cost-push shock under commitment.11 In each case we retain
the benchmark parameterization of Table 1 and set χ =0 .0078 following Galí (2003).
Figure 4 displays the IRFs for a purely transitory cost-push shock. In the standard
zero steady-state inﬂation case, the monetary authority responds to a cost-push shock by
raising the nominal interest rate above steady state for a few quarters, thereby creating
prolonged adjustment of the output gap and an aggressive deﬂation. As is well known,
the reaction of the interest rate and output gap are smaller but more persistent than
under discretion. Indeed, forward-looking price setters are reluctant to raise prices after
a cost-push shock if they expect the monetary authority to respond with a protracted
period of tight policy.
The introduction of trend inﬂation has substantial qualitative and quantitative ef-
fects on the IRFs. Recall that trend inﬂation makes price setters more forward-looking
(see Section 2.2) and monetary policy less eﬀective. When inﬂation dynamics are more
forward-looking there are greater incentives for the monetary authority to inﬂuence ex-
pectations, so we expect a strengthening of typical optimal commitment policy features
such as lower impact eﬀects and greater persistence. With monetary policy less eﬀective,
we expect monetary policy to react less aggressively. The increase in forward-looking
behavior and loss of eﬀectiveness both point towards a decrease in the impact multipli-
ers on ˆ ı and ˆ Y , while the extra forward-lookingness suggests a higher degree of inertia.
Figure 4 illustrates that this is indeed the case, with higher levels of trend inﬂation
smoothing the IRFs and dampening the impact eﬀects. For levels of trend inﬂation up
to 6% the pattern of the endogenous variables is intuitively plausible. For 8% or 10%
trend inﬂation the dynamics properties of the system become quite striking. At these
high levels of trend inﬂation the reduction in inﬂation per unit of output loss is very
low, and the policy maker ﬁnds it optimal to keep the output gap almost constant. The
interest rate is set slightly above expected future inﬂation, producing obvious volatility
in inﬂation.
Gains from commitment
To assess the welfare implications of trend inﬂation, we calculate the unconditional
loss E (W)=Va r(ˆ πt)+χV ar(ˆ Yt) under commitment and discretion, together with the
percentage gain from commitment 100×(1 − Lc/Ld). Lc and Ld denote the losses under
commitment and discretion respectively. Table 3 reports the results.
Several features are worthy of note. Firstly, discretion always leads to greater ex-
pected welfare losses than commitment, since under discretion the monetary authority
lacks the capacity to inﬂuence future expectations. Secondly, welfare losses increase with
trend inﬂation under both discretion and commitment, regardless of the persistence of
shocks. In comparison to a policy that targets zero inﬂation, a policy that targets 2%
inﬂation (as the stability-oriented policy announced by the ECB supposedly does) in-
volves a remarkable percentage loss in welfare. Hence, even very low levels of trend
inﬂation do substantial harm to the performance of optimal monetary policy. Thirdly,
the last column of Table 3 reports the percentage gain from commitment. Given that
trend inﬂation increases the importance of inﬂuencing future expectations, one might
expect the gains to commitment to be increasing in trend inﬂation. This is true only for
moderate levels of trend inﬂation. For example, when ρ =0the percentage gain to com-
mitment is increasing in trend inﬂation up to an annual rate of 2.4%. After this the gain
11In computing impulse response functions we follow the approach of Soderlind (1999).
12remains positive but starts to decline. With ρ =0 .5 the threshold level of trend inﬂation
is 4.8%. This ﬁnding derives from the second eﬀect of positive trend inﬂation, namely
that it reduces the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy. At high levels of trend inﬂation the
eﬀectiveness of policy is reduced to such an extent that inﬂation becomes very costly to
control. Policies under commitment and discretion become similar as they both begin
to disregard inﬂation and the gain to commitment is reduced. This result is apparent
in the behavior of the unconditional variances of ˆ π and ˆ Y . Fourthly, Table 3 shows that
persistence in the shock tends to increase the percentage gains to commitment.
Finally, in separate calculations we analyzed the robustness of our results to two
extensions of the basic model: (i) elastic labor supply; (ii) strategic complementarities
arising from sector-speciﬁc labor markets. All the above results are robust to these
modiﬁcations, with quantitatively stronger eﬀects particularly apparent when strategic
complementaries are introduced.12
5 Conclusions
With signiﬁcant levels of post-war inﬂation in developed countries and central banks
typically targeting positive rates of inﬂation, it is somewhat surprising that the monetary
policy literature has taken zero inﬂation steady-state models as a benchmark. We think
it is very important that the main model in the literature is robust to allowing for
positive trend inﬂation level.
The contribution we make is to extend the seminal model of Clarida et al. (1999)
and Galí (2003) to allow for a generic steady-state inﬂation rate. The resulting simple
framework is tractable and encompasses existing models as a special case. Our main
ﬁnding is that optimal monetary policy is highly sensitive to the level of trend inﬂa-
tion. In particular, monetary policy becomes less eﬀective at stabilizing the economy
once trend inﬂation increases. This occurs because trend inﬂation ﬂattens the NKPC
and makes inﬂation less responsive to the output gap. Moreover, under discretion the
rational expectations equilibrium is not always determinate and the eﬃcient policy fron-
tier deteriorates substantially. Under commitment, interest rate smoothing increases as
trend inﬂation rises. More generally, impulse responses and gains to commitment are
highly sensitive to the level of trend inﬂation.
Our results are naturally sensitive to the assumptions of no indexation and ﬁxed
contract length in the standard model. A relaxation of either of these would weaken our
conclusions. With respect to the no-indexation assumption, Ascari (2004) shows that
indexation reduces the eﬀect that trend inﬂation has on the NKPC. In the limit, full
indexation removes the eﬀect completely. However, we stress that our concern is with
low levels of trend inﬂation such as those observed post-war in developed countries, in
which case the sticky price assumption is reasonable. Moreover, (i) in reality we do
not observe indexed prices; (ii) we have known that full indexation is not optimal since
at least Gray (1976); (iii) the theoretical microfoundations of price indexation schemes
are rather questionable; and (iv) the main justiﬁcation for price indexation in studies
such as Christiano et al. (2005) is empirical not theoretical. With respect to the ﬁxed
12All calculations appear in the working paper version of this article, available on the websites of the
authors.
13contract length assumption, we ﬁnd it reasonable to ﬁx the expected duration of prices
exogenously for moderate levels of trend inﬂation.
More generally, our results serve as a warning against the use of existing New Key-
nesian models in empirical analysis of postwar data. It is preferable to work with models
such as ours that properly account for trend inﬂation. However, an issue remains in that
the levels of trend inﬂation we examine are inconsistent with long-run maximization of
our assumed loss function. We acknowledge this problem, but see it as highlighting the
pressing need for models that endogenously deliver optimal long-run inﬂation rates that
are positive. Such models are likely to have even greater modiﬁcations of the short-run
NKPC, and may lead to both quantitatively and qualitatively diﬀerent results.
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156T a b l e s
Parameter βσ c σm αθ
Value 0.99 1 1 0.75 11
Table 1: Benchmark Calibration (quarterly)
Annual Trend Inﬂation 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10%
Output Half Life 3.5 3.9 4.4 5.1 6.3 8.7
Inﬂation Half Life 3.5 3.8 4.3 5 6.1 8.3
Table 2: Half-Life of Output and Inﬂation (quarters)
16Parameter values Discretion Commitment %Gain
γρ Var(ˆ πt)V a r ( ˆ Yt)L o s sVar(ˆ πt)V a r ( ˆ Yt)L o s s
10 0.265 32.025 0.514 0.222 22.096 0.394 23.397
1.005 0 0.489 26.949 0.699 0.361 20.411 0.520 25.609
1.01 0 0.741 15.373 0.861 0.530 15.302 0.649 24.601
1.015 0 0.916 5.248 0.957 0.692 7.766 0.753 21.333
1.02 0 0.987 0.842 0.993 0.795 1.605 0.807 18.743
1.025 0 1 0.019 1 0.839 0.044 0.840 16.016
10 . 5 0.635 76.843 1.234 0.283 67.597 0.811 34.313
1.005 0.5 1.563 86.1 2.235 0.605 84.986 1.268 43.243
1.01 0.5 3.18 65.992 3.695 1.216 89.19 1.912 48.256
1.015 0.5 4.831 27.669 5.047 2.151 60.169 2.620 48.08
1.02 0.5 5.639 4.809 5.677 2.956 14.213 3.067 45.973
1.025 0.5 5.707 0.108 5.708 3.369 0.425 3.372 40.922
Table 3. Welfare Analysis.
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Figure 1. Impulse responses functions to a money supply growth rate shock.
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